Proceedings of the 29th Chinese Control Conference July 29-31, 2010, Beijing, China
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Combinatorial Auction Mechanism Design for GHP Slot Allocation*
WANG Fei1, WANG Hongyong1, WU Yi2
1. Air Traffic Management Research Base, Civil Aviation University of China, Tianjin, 300300, P. R. China E-mail: email@example.com
2. Business School, Hohai University, Nanjing 210098, P. R. China E-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org
Abstract: In order to allocate airport slots efficiently and fairly, the auction theory was used to design slot auction mechanism, including allocation rules and payment rules. Firstly, aming at the 2-2 slot trading, winner determination model was presented and solved. Secondly, the payments of airlines and traffic flow management department were calculated, following the vickrey payment rule. Thirdly, several new payment rules were proposed to meet the demand of budget balance. Finally, a example simulation was carried out. The results show that combinatorial auction can satisfy the airline’s decision-making objectives and the new payment rules can meet balanced budget requirements. Key Words: Air Traffic Control, Ground Holding Policy, Slot Allocation, Combinatorial Auction Mechanism, Budget Balance
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